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THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTES
PETER L. STRAUSS*

Controversies about statutory interpretation and the proper

roles for judges in interpretation are particularly noticeable in
the Supreme Court but have penetrated downward throughout
the judicial system. What I mean to explore here are some
implications of our common law heritage and the presuppositions
of a common law system for these controversies, that seem rarely
noticed in the ongoing debates. I mean by this not only common
law judging, but also what we might call common law legislating-that is, the practice of creating statutes to achieve marginal
changes in existing law in response to perceived deficiencies,
rather than legislating comprehensively as continental codes seek
to do. At its most basic, my argument will be that our fundamental commitment to the common law, including our commitment
to the system of precedent in statutory interpretation, is inconsistent with one approach to interpretation strongly bruited in the
debates; this approach argues that the only proper (perhaps even
the only constitutionally permissible) aim of interpretation is
determining the textual meaning of a statute as of the date of its
passage.

* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. Derived from the Forty-First
Annual John R. Coen Lecture delivered at the University of Colorado School of Law
.on April 20, 1998, this paper owes much to the faculty of Hong Kong University Law
School, where I presented an early version, and to my colleagues Kent Greenawalt,
Peter Lindseth, John Manning, and Jeremy Waldron. Its eccentricities and errors
are of course my own. Many thanks are due also to Charles Sensiba who gracefully
helped produce a skeletal documentation for a paper prepared for oral delivery.
The written literature on this subject is, by now, daunting. Just among my own
colleagues, the recent work of Greenawalt, Manning and Waldron has added
enormously to the dialog.

See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT

(forthcoming 1998); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, Twenty Questions About Statutory
Interpretation: A Brief Comprehensive View (Feb. 23, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Law Review). This paper
inevitably draws from those debates, and tries however imperfectly to acknowledge
its debts; but it is not a place from which to start a journey into the literature.
Readers who wish a recent, thorough, and interesting assessment of the literature
would do well to start with a young scholar's recent essay, Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti,
Statutory Interpretation,DemocraticLegitimacy and Legal System Values, 21 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 233 (1997). Here, readers must evaluate the force of the arguments
as they might have been heard, without the aid of much fine print at page's bottom.
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My argument is premised in the reactive, pragmatic, and
precedential qualities of a common law system. Before getting to
this doubtless controversial proposition, however, it seems useful
to lay some groundwork that I hope will be less problematic.
First, let me observe that the question what are proper
techniques for statutory interpretation and the question what are
proper roles for judges in interpretation are slightly different.
Lawyers, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens interpret statutes
just as courts do, although of course they may be influenced by
their knowledge how a court is likely to act. Questions about
interpretation that; is specifically judicial are influenced by our
ideas about judicial roles, about the precedential force of a
judicial decision for future disputes, and perhaps also by the
timing of judicial decisions. Even in a society that makes
declaratory judgment freely available, we can observe, judicial
decisions often come considerably after other actors have had to
make decisions about statutory meaning, decisions on which
large sums may turn;' and it is at least possible that we will
think this element of timing has something to do with our
analysis.
A second characteristic of the issue for judges, as well as for
bureaucrats, is that questions concerning how best to interpret
statutes have a political aspect lacking for members of the public.
Judges are a part of government, in a generalizable relationship
to its other elements. Because their decisions help shape the
evolving framework of law by which society is governed, questions of their responsibilities as a part of government enter into
the analysis. In my judgment the common law responsibilities of
judges in our political system are central to a thoughtful consideration of the problem of interpretation.

1. Thus, in Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in 1902 and then the Supreme Court in 1904 dealt with the Railway Safety
Appliance Act of 1893. See 196 U.S. 1, 13 (1904). This Act required railroads
immediately to commit substantial funds to purchasing safety equipment. See id.
at 13-14. These investments were essentially complete by the time litigation over
the consequences of an accident required the courts to decide central questions about
the nature of that obligation-questions railroad general counsel and the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC") had, perforce, been obliged to resolve to their own
satisfaction during the interim period. The Annual Reports of the ICC for the years
1894-1900 detail the variety of implementation issues faced and the progress of
railroad investment. See Peter L. Strauss, Cases and Materials: Legal Methods 200.18 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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With this groundwork in mind, it will be useful now to sketch
the American controversy and to suggest in a preliminary way
how it is tied to our particular political system.
Simplifying a bit, we can identify three different attitudes
toward how one should determine the meaning of a text.
Textualists, who come to their task with a variety of ideas about
the rigidity of the interpretive enterprise, agree that statutory
meaning is to be found in the words the legislature has
used-read with sensitivity and attention to context, perhaps,
but most importantly read for textual meaning uninstructed by
political history or other like considerations.2 Purposivists, by
contrast, prefer to interpret statutes in relation to broad purposes
that they derive not only from the text simpliciter, but also from
an understanding what social problems the legislature was
addressing and what general ends it was seeking. Such an
understanding, of necessity, requires some awareness of the
political context in which the legislation arose and the mischief
it was understood to address. Finally, intentionalists concern
themselves more directly with actual, historical understandings
of statutes that can be ascribed to the members of the legislature-usually, its responsible leaders, who are assumed to speak
for the body as a whole when they address disputable questions
of meaning.
In addition to these three approaches to finding meaning, we
can identify two polar stances towards how that meaning can
vary over time. Some interpreters take the position that statutes
are static.3 For them, the meaning of a statute is invariable-a
statute always means what it meant at the moment of its
adoption. Once a common law court has determined that issue,
of course, the system of precedent works to fix what the statute
always meant as of the moment of that interpretation; that issue
is not ordinarily open for reexamination. In this view, statutory
meaning is fixed as of the moment of passage and can be altered
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historicaland Critical
Introductionto HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at li, cxxv-cxxxiv (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958); Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti,
Statutory Interpretation,Democratic Legitimacy and Legal System Values, 21 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 283 (1997).

3. Etymologically, both "statute" and "static" are remotely linked to the Latin
stare, to stand. 16 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 561, 564 (2d ed. 1989). There is,

however, no necessary relation of meaning.
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only by new legislation. 4 Other interpreters regard statutes as
integral parts of a dynamic legal system. They may rather say
that a statute's meaning is always determined in the current day,
legal system as it has
reflecting what it has become in the
5
evolved since the moment of passage.
Neither textualism, purposivism, nor intentionalism is
inevitably static or dynamic in character.6 One should imagine,
rather, a grid like Figure 1, with possibilities throughout. Thus,
a textualist who sees statutes to be static will be concerned with
what meaning the words of the statute had at the moment of its
adoption-how the statute's language would be understood in
relation to other laws in force at that time, and so forth. A
dynamic textualist will rather be concerned with how a contemporary reader would understand the language employed, in
relation also to the law of the current day, including the language
of other, perhaps more recent, statutes then in force. A person
concerned with statutory purpose would consider, more broadly,
what individuals subject to a statute would have understood it as
seeking to' accomplish at the time of its enactment, or what
function it serves in the law in the current day. She will be much
.more concerned than the textualist with political history; she will
assume that legislators are attempting to achieve rational ends
in the legal system, to respond to some problem they have
identified, and to ameliorate it in ways that make political sense
in terms of the time frame she employs. Finally, a person
concerned with particular intentions will be searching much
more precisely for evidence of exactly how legislators understood
the meaning of the words they were enacting, or what contemporary administrators have taken their language to mean.7

4. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996). An extended
analysis of a recent Supreme Court term in which this problem was prominent
appears in Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common
Law, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 429, 437-38.
5. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at cxxix n.333.
6. This point was particularly well made in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988). See also Strauss, supra note
4, at 440.
7. See generally Peter L. Strauss, When the JudgeIs Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990).
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Figure 1
Static

Dynamic

Textualism
Purposivism

Intentionalism
Each of these positions has had adherents in recent American history. Until about fifteen years ago, however, there was
little theoretical discussion of them, and it might also be fair to
say that since the emergence of legal realism in the early part of
this century, a limitation of statutory analysis to statutory text
has been reserved for only the most straightforward of
cases-those where one confidently knew, on reading the statute,
what it meant.8 Both purpose and a narrower, "intended"
meaning were invoked where the occasion seemed to call for it,
and courts did not appear to pay much attention to whether they
were giving a statute a meaning it had always had, or making it
the best they could make it in terms of the current structure of
law. Opinions mentioned dictionaries very infrequently.9 They
often relied upon legislative history.'°
All of this began to change with the appointment of more
conservative Justices to the Supreme Court, notably Justice
Antonin Scalia, but also Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Thomas.1 Opinions began to voice principled objections to
the use of legislative history, instead referring frequently to
dictionaries, and even observing the difference between period
dictionaries (which would reflect how words would have been

8. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History
in ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
AM. U. L. REV. 277, 279-81 (1990).
9. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
10. See Wald, supra note 8. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
11. A considerable literature addressed this change, much tied to Justice
Scalia. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 231; Nicolas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
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understood when written) and recent dictionaries that could tell
one only how they would be understood when read.12 The decided
trend has been toward the formalities of textualism and toward
an understanding of statutes as static. On this view, judges are
to say what statutes meant when enacted, and have always
meant ever since.
The arguments supporting this trend have at times acquired
a constitutional hue. In a notable Supreme Court concurrence for
himself and two others, Justice Kennedy argued that separation
of powers considerations forbade the Court's use of legislative
history materials. 3 Only Congress can make law, and Congress
can make law only by enacting words, he reasoned. 4 It does
not-cannot--enact the materials of legislative history.'5 Justice
Kennedy's way of putting this argument appeared to deny the
Court's status as a common law court in the Anglo-American
tradition, as have other opinions in cognate areas--expressing
skepticism, for example, whether the Court is constitutionally
permitted to infer a federal common law remedy for the undoubted violation of a valid federal regulatory or criminal
statute.' 6 Thus, this argument appears to run, judges are
constitutionally obliged to be careful in reading a statute and are
not to add to it anything that the legislature's words do not
directly command. My colleague John Manning has made a
similar argument in ways that seem to raise fewer questions
about judicial process. 7 Judges paying attention to the materials
of legislative history, he argues, encourage legislators to attempt
to make law in a manner not open to them, by manipulating the
content of those materials, which they can do without having to
secure their colleagues' approval. I have addressed Professor

12. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998); Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267
(1994). See also Strauss, supra note 4, at 509-13.
13. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467-89
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. See id. at 470.
15. See id. at 474-75.
16. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting). See also Strauss, supra note 4, at 536-40. See generally
.Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1985).
17. See generally John F. Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997).
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Manning's argument in another place.'8 Here, it seems useful to
focus on the argument for textualism as it concerns the judiciary's role in our government.
Let us start with what is, from a world perspective, a
structural oddity of our particular version of separation of
powers-an oddity that in my judgment has strong implications
for the interpretive enterprise. Because the American President
and each member of Congress are separately elected, and because
we do not have a tradition of strong party discipline in the
legislature, what Congress enacts into law is much less in the
control of the government, as one might usually describe the
executive branch, than is usually the case in England, western
Europe, or other parliamentary democracies. The President can
and does propose legislation to Congress, but so do many others.
Yet the legislation Congress enacts is the result of lengthy and
intensely political discussions and developments entirely within
the legislative branch. The President and others might hope to
influence those discussions but cannot control their result. That
is determined strictly by the votes of the members of Congress,
who are always free to vote as they choose, without regard even
for the wishes of a President who is a member of their own party.
The American government does not fall when the party in charge
fails to enact important legislation; no member of the Congress
loses party membership, or is otherwise disciplined, when she
votes in a way different from what her party leadership would
prefer.
This may suggest one reason why debates over the use of
legislative materials in interpretation have played such a large
role in American discussions. We may sometimes succeed in
enacting carefully prepared legislation, but that is a rarity. In
the usual case, we lack travaux preparatoire,white papers, or
academic explanations of a thoughtfully prepared text. If one
wanted to be able to understand the background of the words
Congress enacted, one would usually have to consult a series of
documents reflecting the discussions in Congress-reports by the
responsible committees, changes made to the bill in the course of
consideration, speeches made in the legislature, and so forth.
These materials are much less elegant than travauxpreparatoire.

18. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain
PoliticalHistory?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1998).
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They are also subject to misunderstanding and manipulation, yet
they are the principal source of information that we have about
the way in which legislative words were understood by the people
who chose them. So if one thinks it relevant to have an idea
what members of the legislature might have thought they were
doing when they adopted legislation, these materials are where
one would have to look.19
Another important and distinctively American contribution
to the problem, in my judgment, lies in how we imagine the role
of judges as lawmakers in interpretation. In the founding case
of our constitutional tradition, Marbury v. Madison,20 our
Supreme Court announced that it was finally for the courts to say
what the law is. In its consistent practice since that time, the
Court has asserted, too, that this final say is rooted in a common
law framework. The Court does not come to the interpretive
question afresh each time it arises; its reading acquires the force
of precedent that itself binds future courts and actors until
overruled.2 1 In a world in which the Constitution controls what
the President and the Congress are permitted to do, the power
finally and durably to say what the Constitution means is an
extremely important one. The Constitution is a written text. It
may be interpreted literally, or in terms of its purposes, or in
relation to what one concludes its drafters intended in some more
specific sense. The choices to be made here have major implications for the power of judges as against the President and
Congress, since they can be overturned only by amending the
Constitution-which is not impossible, but very difficult to
accomplish--or by persuading the judges that they were wrong.

19. Interestingly, the generally textualist members of the Court signaled at one
point in the Term just completed that they were quite prepared to rely on material
having the character of travauxpreparatoire.See Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464
(1997); Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997). In Foster,the first of these
,two otherwise unanimous cases, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented
from the majority's reliance on some legislative history materials. 118 S. Ct. at 466.
But in Salinas, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, without apparent hesitation
or doubt, cited the explanatory materials of the Model Penal Code, as good an
example of the travauxpreparatoiregenre as may exist in American law. 118 S. Ct.
at 477-78. See also United States v. Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1865-67 (1998) (citing

the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1(1958).
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Finding an acceptable interpretive style, then, has enormous,
even political, importance.
Although the Courts' interpretations of statutes can be more
easily corrected if they are wrong than its interpretations of our
Constitution, here too the chance for political conflict is not
insubstantial. Because of our common law heritage, our judges
also do not decide statutory questions just for the case at hand.
Once they have interpreted a statute, their reading becomes a
precedent for the future. Indeed, they have tended to say that
precisely because Congress can correct their "mistakes," they
should be more hesitant to change a statutory interpretation
than a decision about the common law for which judges are
wholly responsible.22 Judges who are not sympathetic to
statutes, who perhaps do not share the political impulses that
produced them, can quickly defeat their operation. In the first
part of this century, we went through a period of struggle
between the political parts of our government and the courts, in
which the courts substantially resisted political changes influencing legislation by applying quite formal techniques of interpretation and, in effect, by refusing to understand what the legislation
was attempting to accomplish. This led to the development of
alternative institutions for deciding some legal questions, to the
creation of a considerable bureaucracy for administration.2 3 It
also led to professional and public debate about the role of the
courts that, for a while, produced a judiciary much more attentive to the political background of legislation.24 In the last decade
or so, as our politics have in general become more conservative
and a substantial number of quite conservative judges have been
appointed to the bench, these difficulties seem to have reappeared.
We rarely pause to consider the systemic implications of our
common law system for the problem of interpretation. Usually,
my impression is, this system is just an unremarked background
element in discussions of interpretation. Thus, in a colleague's
recent paper, I found the following:

22. See Neal, 516 U.S. at 295-96.
23.

Cf. Louis L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
133-36 (2d ed. 1961).
24. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 247; cf. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on Reading the Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
CASES AND MATERIALS
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Those who believe that the meaning of a statute is fixed at
enactment may view "mistaken" precedents more narrowly,
and as more easily overruled, than those who favor an
"evolving law"; but virtually no one contends that statutory
precedents have only the status that the force of their reasoning carries.
[If that were so, statutes] would carry no more force than
a professional article asserting the same points that was
brought to the attention of the judges. 5
As an observation about American legal practice, these words are
unexceptionable. What I would like us to note, however, is that
it is an observation about American legal practice. If we were in
a civilian jurisdiction-say, France or Germany-we could also
find disagreements between people who regard statutes as static,
formal documents, and those who find in them a more flexible
framework whose meaning can evolve in response to changing
social circumstances. Both sets of people, however, would
probably agree that judicial pronouncements about what statutes
mean "have only the status that the force of their reasoning
carries, '2 6 and that professional articles provide not just equal
but even superior bases for understanding what a statute means.
Judges in those systems, one might say, are just interpreters, and
they acknowledge that they are not the only (or even the best)
interpreters. Their interpretation is of necessity final in any
given case, but they do not assert the right finally to say what the
law is in any larger sense. Interpretations might or might not
vary over the years, but if they do it is not because of what prior
interpreters may have said. Social circumstances having
changed, interpretations might change with them; but the fact of
a particular interpretation does not itself change the law that is
being interpreted. The view of a committed and dispassionate
scholar can carry even greater force than that of a judge responding in greater haste and with perhaps less training to the
particular contingencies before her.
The raging debates over interpretation have not much
remarked this contingent observation about what we might call

25. Kent Greenawalt, Twenty Questions About Statutory Interpretation: A
Brief Comprehensive View 14 & n.17 (Feb. 23, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the University of ColoradoLaw Review).
26. Id. at 14.
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the conversational quality of American statutory interpretation.
It is time now to see where it can take us. That is, I am going to
build on the premise that the American legal system is, as a
matter of constitutional commitment, a common law system, in
which law emerges from the decisions of judges as well as the
votes of legislatures, in which statutory precedents have more
status than the force of their reasoning conveys. It is not that
judges could not, in fact and in practice, abandon this system
and, by force of repeated decision, convert American statutory
interpretation to the civilian model. Perhaps they couldalthough, paradoxically, that too would take its force from the
system of precedent. But if they did effect this change, we would
all recognize, I believe, that something quite fundamental was
happening, that we were experiencing a switch that cast adrift
our understanding of a distinctive feature of the American legal
system.
Another way of approaching the same observation is to
remark that the kind of statute undergirding the civilian
attitude, the Code Civile, let us say, has characteristics that
support the more distinctly separated judicial and legislative
roles characteristic of western European legal systems. These
statutes emerge in a single legislative act, after exquisite
intellectual consideration, as an integrated whole. They are
rarely if ever amended; and if amended, only after equivalent
study and attention to the integrated effects of change. A
cohesive, comprehensive, enduring text, not easily changed in
any forum, the Code Civile-like, say, our Restatements-invites
scholarly explication and judicial modesty. Understanding its
'intricacies and interrelationships, courts would naturally
hesitate to give more than provisional status to their applications
of its terms to particular congeries of fact. It is obvious which is
the permanent literary work and which, the contingent encounter. No one confuses author with reader. That interpretations
may change is natural as readers change, but that which is read
remains constant. The deposit of past readings is no better than
interesting; the text remains the challenge.
Of course other systemic features of those legal systems are
also in play there. The legal culture and social expectations
about it are different from what they are here. Judges' training,
careers, the mechanisms for their appointment, their social and
political standing, all differ sharply from our own. A young
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colleague to whom I showed an earlier draft of this essay, expert
in French public law, wrote me that:
[T]he actual practice of civil law judging is less alien to our
tradition than is usually supposed, in ways that I think
actually support your basic argument about the relationship
between judging and statutes.
Codes can be notoriously vague-the French tort provisions are the favorite example of teachers of comparative
law-requiring extensive judicial elaboration. The current
meaning of French tort law has much more to do with
well-settled precedent-la jurisprudence constante; e.g.
relating to strict products liability-than the Code's original
references to delictual responsibility for "une faute." Codes
must also be, by definition, sufficiently general to handle a
variety of unforeseen circumstances ("f6conde en ses
cons6quences," as the French put it). Therefore, the prevailing
method of interpretation, to use your terminology, is purposive
and dynamic (the so-called "teleological method of interpretation").27
The metaphors that are evoked in American discussions of
statutory interpretation, it may be noted, often misleadingly
assume that the act of interpretation has no permanent effect on
the text being interpreted. Whether we are invited to consider
reading statutes as comparable to the reading of literary texts, of
the Bible, or of musical compositions, 28 our attention is called to
.a text with a distinctive creator (the legislature) and a different
reader (the judge). The interpreter might mention that statutory
text does not have a distinctive creator, but that is by way of
introducing the difficulties of collective authorship. This makes
problematic the idea that legislation can have an "intent" if it
emerges from the highly variable participation of 535 legislators
divided among two Houses of Congress and their many committees and subcommittees, and assisted by innumerable staff and
lobbyists. However imperfect it may be to think of authorship,
then, author and reader are still distinct. It is, in a way, easy to
celebrate the individuality and contribution of the reader-the

27. E-mail letter from Peter Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal
Studies Center, Columbia University, to Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law,
Columbia University (Apr. 14, 1998) (on file with the author).
28. See generally Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation,47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947).
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interpreter-if we do not notice that her act of interpretation
controls future readings by others. To be sure, the power of
particular readings or our habit of hearing a poem read a
particular way may influence how other readers approach the
text, in sympathy or abreaction. Yet there is no formal power to
control here. That Furtwangler and Toscanini each give different
readings of a Beethoven symphony29 expresses a kind of truth
about the human spirit; and it does not matter which of them
gets to the text first.
Of course, the audience's stake in how a statute is read
rather differs from its interest in the rendering of a symphony or
play, as has been noticed.3" We are not as interested in originality in our statutory interpreters, in the way we might be in our
conductors; we want closure and we want predictability, important legal system values.3 ' We may also have a more important
political claim to faithfulness to authorial instructions than
marks our theatergoing. How a poem is read does not ordinarily
have significant real-world consequences. But the particular
difference I want to start us out with is that, as we usually think
about it, how the poem is read does not authoritatively change its
text for future readers. In a system that gives precedential force
to authoritative readings, as the American system does, the text
does change. Future readers must equally consider those
readings with the initial text.
Our metaphors about interpretation are troubled, too, by the
conversational qualities of statute-making in the paradigmatic
common law context. In the civilian code model, a statute is in
contemplation self-contained. It is the product of deliberate
reflection in terms of a unified structure of law and a coherent
and, at least in design, independent and complete intellectual
product. By contrast, statutes in a common law system ordinarily emerge against the backdrop of the common law, as
legislators observing imperfections in the existing state of law
attempt to fashion responses. The processes that generate them
are more political than intellectual. In particular, comprehensive
efforts to place and reconcile new statutory enactments with the

29.
30.
M. Fiss,
31.

See id. at 1260-61.
See generally Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fics, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Owen
Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 2, at 240-56.
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existing body of law are relatively rare.3 2 It may even be assumed by those who write the legislation, and by the public
receiving it, that that work will be done by judges, pursuing "the
ideal of a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven
into a seamless whole by the processes of adjudication."" That
ideal, again, reflects a reader who authoritatively changes the
text; and now we see a further quality, that the new text is to be
received into, and perhaps will alter, a framework of authoritative meaning that has been generated exactly by those who are
responsible for reading it. How those readers understand their

32. As my colleague Peter Lindseth also pointed out, see supra text
accompanying note 27, the reality in civilian systems often operates in this fashion
as well-and the civilian understanding, if anything, strengthens the argument of
this paper:
The legislative response of choice [to the realization that social and
economic circumstances have changed since the adoption of code
provisions] is not direct amendment of the Code itself-legislators, too,
respect the systematic nature of the Code-but so-called "ancillary
legislation" to solve the specific problem at issue. The amending effect,
of course is the same, because the more specific law will trump the more
general. In code-based systems, one cannot evaluate the overall state of
the law in a specific area simply by looking at the code (there is, for
example, so much ancillary commercial legislation in France that
commentators speak of"decodification"). In this sense, your description
of statutes in the common law system-resulting from legislators
"observing imperfections in the existing state of the law [and]
attempt[ing] to fashion responses"-is not so far from the nature of
ancillary legislation in a code-based system ....

And ultimately, the

responsibility of meshing these disparate laws into a workable legal
system falls to the judge, again providing him/her with some considerable
normative leeway.
Of course, this entire discussion relates primarily to private law,
where the great civil and commercial codes prevail. However, public law
adjudication, in my experience, is in fact even closer to the common law
model that you advance. In France, at least, the method and interpretative
prerogatives of the administrative judge are much closer to that of the
common law judge-administrative law and regulatory practice is
ultimately what the Conseil d'Etat says it is until the legislature/[g]overmnent changes the law/reg[ulations]. The irony here is that, historically,
administrative jurisdiction developed in France (in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries) for strikingly similar reasons that it did in the [U.S.]
in the twentieth [century]: political distrust of the judicial courts. The
great achievement of the French administrative judiciary has been the
capacity to exploit its organic attachment to the executive to develop a
truly independent system nf legal control of state action.
E-mail letter from Peter Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal Studies
Center, Columbia University, to Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia
University, supra note 27.
33. Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 12 (1936).
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responsibilities in relation to their prior readings and this new
(as they might see it) intrusion has evident importance.
Perhaps at this point my readers will be thinking that these
observations are somewhat out of date. Statutes intruded into
the framework of the common law when the American Constitution was adopted, but today we live in a world of statutes, and
especially so at the federal level, the level at which the contemporary American debates have largely been generated.34 Yet, as my
colleague's comment may have suggested,3 5 the common law
framework, and in particular the idea of precedent, continues to
dominate our thinking. At the state level, the common law
largely continues to provide the framework within which
statutory work is done. 6 If federal judges have given up the idea
that there exists a general federal common law, they have not
abandoned the presuppositions of a common law system. They
remain able, if at times reluctant, to generate common law
solutions in the aegis of federal statutes;3 7 and, in particular,
federal judges remain committed to the idea of precedent, to the
idea that their readings do acquire authoritative force, above and
beyond what a professor might achieve in an academic writing
like this one.
The workings of a system of precedent ought to suggest that
the debates over interpretation should focus on the legislative-

34.

See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982); Samuel Estreicher, Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a
-Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (1982).

35. See supratext accompanying note 25.
36. This point was made gracefully by Hans Linde, a voice of lonely eloquence
in calling our attention to the institutions of state law. See generally Hans A. Linde,
State ConstitutionsAre Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner'sFailedDiscourse,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993); Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?,
34 ARIz. L. REV. 215 (1992).
37. Not all Supreme Court Justices in recent times have observed the

important difference between the absence of general common law authority-a
proposition easily tied to the limited legislative competence of the federal
government-and the question whether they are judges in the common law model.
Yet it is hard to imagine an understanding of our Constitution that did not affirm
that they are judges in the full sense that would have been understood at the
drafting, and at all intervening points to the current day. It is also hard to imagine
such a reading that would have authoritative force, in its own terms. To deny their
status as common law judges is to deprive their textual readings of that force,
outside the boundaries of the particular case they are deciding. Any force their
judgments may have as law, that is, comes only from the presuppositions of a
common law system. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 536-40; cf. Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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judicial dialog over time. Certainly, the qualities of those
interactions have, at times, affected both judicial and legislative
behaviors in important ways. Yet discussions about interpretation tend to address the issues in terms of some particular
statute being interpreted. Larger views of process may be
invoked in describing the operation of Congress as an institution,
and how one or another approach to interpretation might
influence the way in which it approaches the development of
statutory text. Still, it is the particular statute that has in fact
been enacted at a particular time that is the subject of this
conversation. We are thinking about how to interpret this
statute, enacted then. What tends not to be evoked is the general
process of law-development, the machinery through which
statutory law evolves over time; how it happens that statutes are
enacted to address some problems and not others; and with what
level of attention to coherence and fit.
Perhaps we do not focus our attention on process because, in
any individual case, what we find seems likely to be depressing
and chaotic. However one likes statutes or sausages, one should
not watch them being made."8 Here, suspect lobbyists; there,
ambitious staff; in the center, politicians whose eyes are on the
prize of reelection and the financial support needed to secure it.
Not doubting these problems, I want to turn our attention to a
characteristic of the legislative process in its largest dimension-that, like the traditional adjudicative development of the
common law, our legislative process is an essentially reactive,
pragmatic process, and not a proactive or rational one."
This characteristic, too, is one about which in my judgment
we have no choice absent social changes much too large to
contemplate, and certainly not appropriate for judges to impose
on our political system out of their own wishes for order. We do
not have individuals or even committees scouring existing law for
its adequacy (by whatever measure), deciding which areas of the
law require rationalization, and then devoting months or years
to the building up of thoughtful, coherent structures. Rather, we
have problems washing up against the legislature over time,
38. This analogy is widely attributed to Otto von Bismark, Chancellor of
Germany. See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 190 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
39. See generally Edward L. Rubin., Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the
Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427 (1989).
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much as (through the common law) they also wash up against the
courts, and eventually acquiring an urgency that produces
response. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on how we
view the teachings of public choice or similar schools, that
response will reflect the view of the current electorate. It takes
its legitimacy from that relationship, as judges' responses to what
washes against their shores take legitimacy from coherence with
other law or accuracy in reflecting social conditions and considerations of justice. Howbeit, what I particularly want to call
attention to is this conversational, continuous, interactive quality
of law-generation by our legislatures; response, rather than
rationalization, is the key impulse. The background assumptions
of our mechanisms for producing statutes are, in this way, just
like the background assumptions of our mechanisms for producing common law: law will emerge, over time, as a series of
pragmatic marginal adjustments to existing social structures.
This account might seem to make hash of what may be the
single most quoted piece of advice in The Legal Process,that bible
of the previous generation of interpreters:
Every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act. The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose
is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible.
Deciding what purpose ought to be attributedto a statute
is often difficult. But at least three things about it are always
easy. (a) The statute ought always to be presumed to be the
work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably, unless the contrary is made unmistakably to
appear. (b) The general words of a statute ought never to be
read as directing an irrational pattern of particular applications. (c) What constitutes an irrational pattern of particular
applications ought always to be judged in the light of the
overriding and organizing purpose.40
People sometimes appear
intended to be descriptive
of, an actual legislative
description might be of a

to react to these words as if they were
of, or at least a response to an account
process. However accurate such a
continental legislature, at least of the

40. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1124-25 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
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idealized continental legislature in its code-generating mode, 4' no
one could believe it as a description of American legislating in
any but the most extraordinary setting. It could perhaps describe
the Uniform Commercial Code, but never the general run of
legislative business.
If, however, we understand that this passage is a normative
statement prescribing proper attitudes for judges in their dealing
with the work of legislatures, rather than a positive one describing what legislatures are, then it is not so trivially susceptible of
disproof (as, viewed descriptively, it has always been in our
system). Then we need to consider it, not in the context of truth
or falsity, but as an element of a working system of law that
includes both legislatures and judges, institutions grounded in
common law sensibilities, each responding in a pragmatic way to
the exigencies that they encounter. Compare the following two
propositions:
1.
2.

"The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is
foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible";4 2 and
The idea of judicial judgment without an intelligible
holding is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible.

For the common law judge, both sentences fit the workings of the
system of precedent well. Prior judgments have more authority
than is generated simply by how, today, we would assess the
force of their stated reasoning; they have that authority independent of specific rationality-in-fact, as they are considered an
element of a working system for continuously approximating a
coherent pattern, a "unified system" of law, a "seamless whole."4
We see that cases with their varying facts move the courts in
patterns that can be judged by what Llewellyn called their
"apperceptive mass";44 we attribute a kind of purposiveness to the
enterprise as a whole-to the shared search for reason, to the

41. We ought not forget that the comparison of legislating and sausage-making
is widely attributed to Otto von Bismarck, see supra note 38, and that civilians
-acknowledge that outside code-making-that is, in the normal domain of public
legislation-their legislating, like ours, is more episodic, reactive, and political than
coherent, proactive, and academic.
42. HART & SACKS, supra note 40, at 1124.
43. Stone, supra note 33, at 12.
44. KARL N. LEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 59

(1960).
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accumulating evidence of results. The common law is, at root, a
pragmatic process of continuous approximation. Seen from a
distance, its patterns emerge as fractals from the seemingly
random process of stimulus and response.
Legislation, too, may be viewed as a process rather than a
series of unconnected individual results; and then it may be
similarly described. The problems on which legislatures act,
analogously to the issues that percolate through common law
processes, are the product of private choices and pressures
resulting from the continuing experience of society under the law
as it has existed up to that point. No more than courts, do our
legislatures expend significant resources in proactively exploring
problems in the abstract that have not been socially experienced.
Yet we can attribute a kind of purposiveness to the enterprise as
a whole and understand it as a pragmatic process of continuous
accommodation. In their ordinary operation, legislature and
court operate in parallel, working marginal change in response
to social pressure, not academic design. The messiness of the
legislative process in individual situations is, in this respect,
almost precisely the point. We have chosen pragmatism over
theoretical elegance. That is, one might say, the defining
characteristic of our common law orientation.
Let us. look again, now, at the proposition that we accord
precedential force to judicial pronouncements about statutory
meaning. By arming a kind of possible competition, this practice
gives our judges' work a political importance that would be
missing from a system in which judges are only interpreters and,
in contemplation, come to statutory language afresh each time
they confront it. If it does not formally matter what prior judges
said about the statute, if the voices of academicians count for as
much, then we might imagine that any errors perpetrated on
particular occasions would be both less influential and more
readily brought to light. It seems at least intuitively likely that
less powerful interpreters, not imagining themselves responsible
for the shape of the law, would respond to social signals of
discomfort with given interpretations by taking a different path
that, formally, remains fully open to them. In a way, academic
explications and explanations provide data about problems and
possibilities, just as an "interpretation only" perspective keeps
judges out of politics' way. It is clear where the law is, and that
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a statute's text calls on each occasion for the interpretation that
will best render its meaning in the current day.
Once interpretations acquire the force of precedent, the
statute changes with the act of interpretation. It can be revised
only by a fresh legislative act, which is not easy to come by,45 or
by a judicial overruling-generally unlikely and often said to be
especially difficult in the statutory context, where the legislature
can overrule error.' Here, the judges are not only exercising a
power of law-making that "interpretation" alone does not claim;
they are also defending their law-making, and enhancing the
power of their claim, by insisting that the judicial reading will
remain the authoritative reading of the statute absent legislative
disapproval. Often presented as if it were an act of self-abnegation (it is for the legislature, after all, not the courts, to make the
law), giving interpretations precedential force actually dramatizes judicial power; it makes the courts a political competitor
with the legislature in the creation of law. Interpretation has
only to become headstrong, as it has under every known approach to it and its materials, for one to see how precedential
effect arms battles between legislature and court.4 7 What the
Court has made of the Sherman Act competes with what the text
of the Act seems to say and what more recent enactments have
been generally understood to accomplish.4" Ostensible legislative
disapprovals of judicial readings are repeatedly found inadequate
in one or another respect, as preferences embodied in precedent
are reasserted.4 9 While the Supreme Court can today announce
a conclusion in terms of what it asserts a statute has always
meant (however it has been understood by lawyers and lower
courts in the years intervening between enactment and its
judgment),5" legislative correction, absent the clearest of indica-

45. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence:
A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,
and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation,45 VAND. L. REv. 687, 698 (1992).
46. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996).
47. See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-15 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
48. See, e.g., Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
49. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 112 n.11 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Estate of Reynolds, 985 F.2d at 475 n.2.
50. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 168-70
(1994).

1999]

THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTES

tors, can operate only into the future.5 ' The presuppositions of a
common
law system thus arm the possibility of interbranch
2
war.

5

51. See, e.g., Landgraf,511 U.S. at 265-66.
52. Subsequent to the Coen Lecture, an editor's query suggested that readers
might find a concrete example helpful to illustrate what has been a somewhat
abstract essay. This example concerns the intersection of two statutes. The first is
a 1984 statute that created the United States Sentencing Commission and instructed
it to implement a general policy of rationalizing sentence practice to reduce
unwarranted sentencing disparities and match sentences with offense seriousness.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994). See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) (documenting the United States Sentencing Commission). The second is a
1986 statute that set mandatory minimum sentences for drug dealers who sold
specified weights of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of'
various drugs, including the drug LSD. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994); see United States
v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), affd sub nom. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). For most illegal drugs sold in "cut" form, the
potency of the drug is a function of the weight percentage of the drug in the mixture,
and so the number of doses in a given weight of mixture sold at the street level is
quite predictable; the weight ranges given in the 1986 statute created five year
minimums for dealers in the tens of thousands of street doses, and ten year
minimums for dealers in considerably higher amounts. See Marshall, 908 F.2d at
1322. For LSD, however, the drug is sold by dose, in carriers whose weights vary
widely-from sugar cube to blotter paper to gelatin square; if the carrier weight is
considered part of the "mixture or substance," the seller of sugar cube LSD could
receive a ten year mandatory sentence for selling a number of doses that would
result in no mandatory minimum at all if the carrier were gelatin. See id. at 133.1-34
(Posner, J., dissenting). Of course, awareness of this outcome doubtless would
encourage knowledgeable dealers to use lighter media, but that is hardly an
ascribable purpose of the legislation; sentencing provisions do not ordinarily favor
the more deviously thoughtful criminal engaging in equally harmful conduct. Even
then, drug pushers would receive mandatory minimum sentences for dealing in
thousands fewer doses of LSD than of other drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, that
one would expect Congress to have regarded as more threatening.
These considerations led to closely divided en banc opinions in the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see id. at 1312, interpreting the sentencing statute
to include LSD carrier weight in "mixture or substance"-opinions characterized by
one scholar of statutory interpretation as the finest he had encountered in his
career. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 254 n.56 (1992). In 1991,
in Chapman v. United States, the Supreme Court, less closely divided, affirmed the
Seventh Circuit; a dissent for two Justices, Stevens and Marshall, noted the absence
of action by the Sentencing Commission on the problem, but substantially relied on
the uniformity-generating policies of the 1984 Act in finding the disparities produced
by that interpretation unacceptable. 500 U.S. at 473.
Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission did act. In a guideline effective in
1993, it instructed courts to treat each dose of LSD on any carrier medium as having
the effective weight of 0.4 milligrams--without regard to the actual weight of the
carrier employed. See Neal v. United States. 516 U.S. 284, 292 (1996). The effect
of this guideline was to assure uniformity in LSD sentencing, and also to make the
number of doses of LSD that would trigger the various mandatory sentences roughly
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The possibilities of inefficiency, even of interbranch war, are
heightened if a court generally denies a dynamic quality to
statutory law, limiting the force of precedent to its own pronouncements. Here is where the element of timing comes to
bear. Our Supreme Court has only one hundred or so opportunities each year to decide issues of any character. Of necessity,
then, many issues percolate through the lower courts for years
without reaching it. It may take decades for them to do so. The
accumulating evidence of lower court action may appear to have
settled some issues during those years. In such a case, Congress
would receive no signal of any problem requiring its action. The
legal order would appear to have come to rest. But as these are
lower court judgments, they have no formal authority over the
opinion of the Supreme Court. If the Court believes that the only
issue for it to decide is what the statute meant as of its enactment, the intervening developments in the lower courts will be
irrelevant, and the Court may quite easily reach a different
conclusion.5 3
In this respect, the Court's behavior is quite different from
the approach that would be taken by a common law court in
viewing a question open for its decision at its level, but which had
been the subject of a uniform trend at the lower court level. That
trend would itself operate as a signal to a common law court-a
reason if not precedent for reaching a similar conclusion. 4 Such

.equal to the numbers having that effect for other serious drugs. Could this new
interpretation, serving undoubted and important congressional policies and uttered
by an agency specifically empowered to implement those policies, prevail?
Writing in 1996, in Neal v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously

rejected any such possibility. Once the Court had determined the statute's meaning
in Chapman, other courts must
adhere to [that] ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and ... assess
an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled law.
, . * Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the
Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed

a more desirable "approach" to calculating LSD quantities. [The courts],
however, do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations
of a statute. True, there may be little in logic to defend the statute's
treatment of LSD .... [The Court here noted the problems of sentence
disparity]. Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for
revising its statutes.

Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
53.

See Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.

1389, 1413-20 (1996) (analyzing Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
v. Greenwich Collieries, Inc., 512 U.S. 267 (1994)); Strauss, supra note 4, at 509-13
(analyzing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).

54. Similar constraints, under the rubric "la jurisprudence constante,"
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legal system values as predictability and stability in law would
argue strongly against breasting such a tide, even though it
would be within the formal power of the court to do so; it would
feel under a considerable obligation to develop reasons and
explanations for its departure from the law as it had been
developing. What the common law had generally been at the last
time the court addressed a similar question would hardly seem
the sole dispositive consideration in this regard.
One difficulty that might be posed to the argument being
developed here is that it assumes a kind of benignity about the
legislative work product. The discussion has been supposing a
kind of partnership between legislature and courts in the work
of government, that in my judgment is instinct in both the
common law idea and, in general, our Constitution. We can,
without difficulty, imagine circumstances in which the idea of
such a partnership would be repugnant. In particular, if the
course charted by the legislature were unjust-say, the propagation of Jim Crow legislation in the United States or apartheid in
South Africa-we might regard as heroic those judges who
withheld their cooperation. In Justice Accused, Robert Cover
argued forcefully that American courts' turn to formalism in the
mid-nineteenth century was significantly in reaction to the moral
repugnance of slavery, which northern judges found themselves
called upon to ratify in the Fugitive Slave Act and other legislative measures of the time.55 As human institutions, legislatures
are no more inevitably benign than are courts. A court, holding
its own commitments to justice, might not merely take refuge in
obstructive formalism, but find it the morally commanded course,
should it find that a legislature had embarked on the course of
injustice.
Is this a course commanded in general by the Constitution,
perhaps as another check on the momentary passions of the
public, like that embodied in the two-house structure of Congress
and the provision for presidential veto? The argument that it
should be (and intentionally was made) hard to legislate verges

characterize issues on which civilian courts and commentators have long come to
rest. See generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil

MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
55. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
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on that claim in some articulations.56 Yet, so baldly put, the
claim amounts to the proposition that we are constitutionally
committed to minimalist government. It imagines the judiciary
as an obstructionist force to the legislature wholly apart from the
justice-in-fact of any given'legislative choice-an attitude quite
impossible to square with the Constitution's general anticipation
that Congress would be the principal source of the nation's laws.
The difficulties are magnified by the fact of precedent's force in
a common law system. If in general Congress has a claim
superior to the courts' to supply law to the nation, it can hardly
be that the courts are to operate as if Congress's every action
were suspect, and to impose on it the obligation of repeated
actions to achieve its ends.
The conclusion that Congress has acted unjustly must have
a more pointed, a more focused source. "Clear statement" rules
are a conventional and accepted expression of doubt on the
subject;5 7 one notes that such rules call for clear statements only
in particular circumstances, in the shadow of identifiable
constitutional doubts about Congress's possible course.5" Even
questions of justice that have identifiable constitutional roots
can be overbroad. Thus, the crisis over "substantive due process"
grew out of judicial concerns for the sanctity of liberty, property,
and contract as much as it did judicial defense of the general
presuppositions of the common law. Perhaps another way to put
the proposition is this: should our system of laws become
institutionally unjust, we might hope for a judiciary that could
help to divert us from that result, as indeed has happened in our
recent history.5 9 Nonetheless, it would be intolerable to have the
courts acting at all times as if our legal system were threatening
that outcome.
Now, it seems appropriate to return to the debates over
interpretation, to the competition between textualism and
alternative approaches framed in terms of purpose or even
specific legislative intent. All of these approaches, one might
note, seem to agree on what is essentially a political proposition-that legislative directions are entitled to prevail over

56. See generally Manning, supra note 17.
57. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. Rvv. 405, 457-59 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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judicial preferences, that a properly enacted statute has priority
over the claims of the common law, and that judicial approaches
to interpretation ought to secure fidelity to what statutes
accomplish and to subdue judicial adventurism. Disagreements
come over how that ought to be accomplished. For the textualist,
only the text is reliably accessible, and dependence on other
indicators risks empowering judicial will and, perhaps worse,
conferring legislative authority on persons not entitled to exercise
it. Those who favor attention to specific legislative intent see
textual approaches as "clever" means for constructing meaning
rather than finding it-using a "limited palette" that puts a
premium on judicial manipulation of language, rather than
focusing attention on legislative will and correspondence to the
social circumstances from which legislation sprang. 6 In its
strongest expression, one may even suggest, the obeisance to
"legislative intent" that characterized the post-New Deal courts
expresses a kind of apology for the federal judiciary's strongwilled resistance to legislation in the 1920s and early 1930s.
Purposivists occupy an unstable middle ground; the search for
"purpose" acknowledges both the groundedness of legislation in
some mischief to which it is supposed to respond (usually but not
invariably signaled by its text) and, at the same time, the
frequent futility (or worse) of seeking specific legislative intention.
Congruent with the exposition thus far, it seems useful to
discuss the problem in a rubric often employed, that of a conversation. Starting with Lieber,6 ' many have framed the problem of
interpretation in terms of a conversation between a master and
her servant. Master and servant have many conversations over
time. There is no question who is entitled to give instructions, or
that there is an institutional interest, instinct in the relationship,
in the servant understanding his instructions well. The particular instruction Lieber uses, accompanied by the presentation of
some money, is to "fetch some soup-meat."6 2 Lieber points out
how much is implicit in this instruction-what cut and quality of
meat is to be bought, where, how quickly, at what kind of price,

60. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 372-73.
61.

See FRANcIs LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28 (Neil H.

Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1994) (1839).
62. Id. at 28.
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for whom, whether the servant is to return the change, and so
forth.6 3 Specification would be inane and useless, Lieber
argues.64 Turning to its baleful effects on the public conversations that concern us, he observes:
The British spirit of civil liberty, induced the English judges
to adhere strictly to the law, to its exact expressions. This
again induced the law makers to be, in their phraseology, as
explicit and minute as possible, which causes such a tautology
and endless repetition in the statutes of that country that
even so eminent a statesman as Sir Robert Peel declared, in
parliament, that he "contemplates no task with so much
distaste as the reading through an ordinary act of
parliament." Men have at length found out that little or
nothing is gained by attempting to speak with absolute
clearness and endless specifications but that human speech is
the clearer, the less we endeavor to supply by words and
specifications, that interpretation which common sense must
give to human words. 5
In the end, he concludes, "somewhere we needs must trust at last
to common sense and good faith."66
In Lieber's example, we might note, the servant has a
pointed interest in correct understanding. It is not only our
conventions about what it means to be a servant, or what are the
qualities of a "good" servant, but also that the master holds the
possibility of dismissing the servant from his job. We can change
the hypothetical a little bit-again, in a way suggested to me by
my colleague's thinking67-to underscore some important
characteristics of the problem in the legislative-judicial context.
Imagine now a public hospital with a civil service nursing staff
responsible for day-to-day administration of medical care,
including the administration of prescriptions for which doctors
are responsible. The doctors' orders for care result from conferences among the various consulting specialists at the hospital.
They are busy and tend to rely on each others' judgment in areas
in which each is expert; they communicate formally with the
nurses by notations on patients' charts. These notations require
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 28-30.
See id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 30-31.
See generally Greenawalt, supra note 25.
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interpretation. Although of course the nurses observe patterns
of notation by the doctors and have informal relationships with
them, they also have much closer and more continuous relationships with individual patients and, consequently, may tend to
believe that they may be somewhat better in seeing the "whole
picture." Of course, the nurses too have an accumulated body of
experience and even expertise on which to draw. We can even
imagine that they have developed conventions about how
particular instructions are to be understood, that once developed
acquire a kind of force of their own in the day-to-day administration of the hospital. Perhaps the nursing staff has even developed a kind of manual all nurses are expected to consult.
You and I, the patients in this hospital, have very real stakes
in how the doctors and nurses understand each other and in any
power struggle that might erupt between them. We probably
value the initiative and even the independence of the nurses, to
a degree. They are more involved in our individual care; they
may sense issues that persons viewing our situation more
abstractly would not quite see. At the same time, we have our
reasons for paying the doctors better and putting them in charge.
They are better able to assess the teachings of science; they are
superior diagnosticians; and they are more likely to see and stay
the long course of treatment required for serious disease than a
nurse responsible for the day-to-day of crisis management. Even
if we imagine that the nurses can usefully embroider on the
instructions they receive as our immediate circumstances may
seem to dictate, we surely start with the wish to have them
accurately and faithfully understand the notations the doctors
have made. We think, in that respect, that if they understand (as
they should) the relevant claims of the doctors to expertise in the
particular case, that will help them in understanding. In a busy
world of limited resources and imperfect language, we want
neither doctors nor nurses attempting the fullest possible
communication; that will hardly eliminate the likelihood of
misunderstanding and, by consuming precious time will limit the
resources available to attend to the health needs of our community. Above all, we also will think that in the end good faith is
required-that we will depend on the nurses to accept the
instructions they receive in the imperfect ways they are almost
necessarily given, and to use every tool at their disposal to
understand their prescription. If the nurses' attitudes are
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headstrong, if they insist on formalities, if they demand to be the
ones who set the terms of conversation, if they in practice refuse
to understand what it is they are being asked to do unless the
request comes in the terms they like, that would place our health
in peril. It would signal the breakdown of a necessary framework
for conversation, a framework that is necessary for our, the
patients', interest.
None of this is to deny, of course, that the doctors in our
imaginary hospital should be trying to express themselves in
terms that their nurses, and perhaps also their patients, can
readily understand. In the refractory world we are now imagining, it is not inconceivable that the doctors, like the English
Parliament of the nineteenth century, would develop ways of
speaking that accommodated to the nurses' wishes; they might
do so simply because they continued to wish to improve their
patients' health, and could understand that this was the only way
to achieve that end. Other outcomes would be possible, too. The
doctors might be able to find, in other cadres of hospital staff,
workers better disposed to carry out their instructions in an
understanding way. Reassigning work to them to the extent they
can would avoid the nurses and their problems.6" Over time, that
might lead the nurses to see that it was in their interest, if they
wished to maintain their importance in the hospital, to be more
open to the doctors' instructions. Still, the struggle itself would
seem a decided disservice to the hospital's patients. Any claim by
the nurses that they were simply preserving and protecting the
doctors' important place in the hospital, by insisting that they
speak with clarity as the nurses chose, and chose finally, to
define it, would strike us as hypocrisy.
It may be apparent by now, if it has not long been, where this
discussion is heading. Legislators and judges are partners in the
work of government. In a democracy, the legislature has the
larger claim for respect for its judgments; but in a common law
system any realistic description is that the two institutions,
legislature and courts, share responsibility for the development
of the law over time. The very fact of precedential force makes it
impossible to say of a judicial reading of a statute that it is

68. Cf. JAFFE & NATHANSON, supra note 23. 1 have not sought here to examine
the
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administrative agency interpreters. See generally Strauss, supra note 7.
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merely interpreting, and that all legal force has been created by
the legislature. Once the judiciary has spoken, the statute will
have been, perforce, reshaped. The common law framework of
judicial action entails that its decision creates precedent having
authority independent of the simple force of its reasoning.
Preserving legislative supremacy in this context, in my
judgment, simply excludes the permissibility of static textualism
as the preferred interpretive approach. Static textualism both
denies the dynamic effect of the Court's own judgment-which,
once pronounced, will have changed the statute's meaning for all
future readings-and ignores the mechanisms by which the
legislature learns, over time, what problems do, and what do not,
require its corrective attention. By forcing legislative attention
to its preferences in expression, rather than learning the legislature's, the Court asserts a prerogative of power quite inconsistent
with its proclaimed submission to legislative judgment. It may
be, indeed, that the very idea of precedent in the context of
statutory interpretation is instinct with inappropriate judicial
power; but, surely, once we have admitted the common law into
that field, judges must be honest about what they are doing.
Correspondingly, they must be assiduous to learn in any way
they can what legislation is about, and how it has been understood by its relevant communities, before purporting to give it
effect. They must respect the reactive nature of the legislative
enterprise, which (no more than the courts) does not speak in the
absence of perceived social problems.
If this paper makes a contribution to what has been a very
wide-ranging debate, that contribution lies in its calling attention
to the longitudinal, dialogic quality of legislative-judicial interaction in a common law system. It is worth summing up, as we
conclude, what in my judgment are the presuppositions of that
discussion:
1.

Courts "make law" as a consequence of the operation of
a system of precedent. That is, however a court may
articulate to itself and the readers of its opinions what
it is doing (establishing a new principle, gap-filling, or
simply finding the right, ostensibly pre-existing rule), a
subsequent court encountering the same or a similar
question will experience its freedom of action as having
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been constrained by the earlier court's action in a way it
would not have been had that action not been taken.
The system of precedent operates in relation to statutory
interpretations, as it does in relation to judicially
developed rules of decision, the common law. Just how
the system of precedent operates may differ as between
the two settings. Courts sometimes argue, for example,
that they are less justified in reexamining the precedents they set in interpreting statutes, because they are
more responsible for the shape of the common law, or
because the legislature is presumed to know their
interpretations and can be expected to disapprove those
with which it disagrees. But this is quite a different
argument from the one that characterizes civilian
jurisprudence, where, in formal understanding, an
interpreting court returns to the language of the statute,
not to its prior interpretations, whenever its application
is at issue.
The legislature is the primary law-maker, and the
judiciary a secondary law-maker. Thus, in case of
conflict between the common law and legislative judgment, absent some supervening principle (such as
constitutional right), the legislative judgment is entitled
to prevail. It will, of course, be a question to what extent
a legislative provision displaces the common law-as, for
example, whether it is to be taken as a preferred source
for analogical reasoning. In principle, however, this
issue, too, is subject to legislative determination. A
court finding the legislature to have repudiated a given
line of common law development would be obliged,
absent some infirmity in the repudiation, to prefer the
legislature's judgment to its own.
In general, the relationship between court and legislature is a cooperative one. Both are elements of government and committed to its success. The legislature's
superior claim to generate governing law entails this
Non-cooperation may be justified in
relationship.
particular instances, but cooperation is the default
position. The courts are not entitled to be neutral, in
general, about securing the ends of government. Resistance to legislative direction must be specially justified.
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In the American governmental system, such resistance
is commonly and appropriately justified on the basis of
commands found in the higher law of the Constitution.
Statutes may be found to violate constitutional principle
in terms; or, as importantly, the force of constitutional
policies may provide reasons to interpret statutes more
narrowly than might otherwise be warranted. Excluded
from this kind of justification, however, are propositions
of social policy touching on economic interests. There is
no general constitutional principle favoring minimal
government, no principle that would entitle judges to
resist legislative direction increasing political controls
over economic behavior. That road was once taken and
was decisively rejected.
One can imagine other comparable justifications,
drawing, for example, on universal principles of human
rights. That is, one can question whether judges are
obliged to cooperate with an unjust political regime; they
may, indeed, have moral obligations to resist it. Again,
however, this cannot be their ordinary stance; judicial
indifference, much less opposition, to the ends of government is unsustainable absent special justification. To
imagine that that burden could be met with regularity,
and across the whole range of a given government's
activities, is to condemn that government on moral
principle; it is, in effect, to assert that it cannot claim
the shelter of lawfulness.

One might think that all of this is a very elaborate way of
rephrasing some observations Grant Gilmore made in his small
jewel of a book, The Ages of American Law. "[W]hat we mean by
law," he said in its opening pages, is not those propositions that
most dramatically affect or reshape a society, but "[t]he process
by which a society accommodates to change without abandoning
its fundamental structure."6 9 We are talking here about the
ordinary case, in a passably just society, that employs precedent
as well as statute-making to generate its governing principles,
and we are asking about judicial attitudes towards understanding statutes in that context. In that context, the presuppositions

69. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 14 (1977).
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and effects of a common law system of legislating and judging, in
my judgment, simply exclude static textualism as an interpretive
option. To adopt that approach is to abandon our fundamental
structures, and to abandon them in the service of a judicial
authority it is hard to imagine many citizens would knowingly
choose.

